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LAVVBEAT 
SUPREME COURT REPORT 
The Fourth Frontier 
With no clear path prepared, Court takes on two more police powers cases 
BY KATHRYN R. URBONYA 
The U.S. Supreme Court 
roamed its newest fron tier- the 
Fourth Amendment-during the 
2000-2001 term. After deciding the 
reasonableness of seven police prac-
tices, it will consi der another two 
search-and-seizure cases next term . 
The recent policing decisions 
reveal no clear path in this 
medical care. City of Indianapolis 
v. Edmond, 121 S. Ct. 447; Kyllo v. 
United States , 121 S. Ct. 2038; Fer-
guson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. 
Ct. 1281. 
Fourth Amendment issues will 
be back before the Court this term, 
when it considers the constitution-
ality of a car stop near the Mexican 
border and a search of a probation-
er's home. 
new frontier. The desti- ............. Two of last term's de-
nation reached was 
determined by the ma-
jority's characteri za-
tion of the case and the 
sources cited. Because of 
the contrasting sources, 
the majority often saw 
a different scene than 
did the dissent. 
These sources in-
cluded 13th century 
Engli sh statutes, 
Am erican histo-
ry, modern polic-
ing practices, and 
records as to the 
purpose of a police 
practice. In the end, 
no one source trumped an-
other, but the sources did take the 
justices in different di.rections. 
Last term, the Cow·t ruled fou.r 
times for the government. 
The justices upheld officers' au-
thori ty to arrest a soccer mom for 
not buckling up her children, to in-
ventory a car after arresting the 
driver for traffic offenses, and to 
impound a house while waiting for 
a warrant. Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 121 S. Ct. 1536; Arkan.sas v. 
Sullivan , 121 S. Ct. 1876; Illinois v. 
McArthur, 121 S. Ct. 946. It also ex-
panded officers' qualified inununity 
shield against claims of unreason-
able force dW'ing atTests . SQ,ucier v. 
Katz , 121 S. Ct. 215l. 
The Court ruled against the 
government three times. It held 
unconstitutional roadblocks estab-
lished to detect drugs, a heat scan 
of a house to detect lights for grow-
ing marijuana, and drug tests of 
pregnant women for cri_minal pros-
ecution done in conjunction with 
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cisions-Atwater and Kyllo 
-stand out because one 
broadly ex panded arrest 
powers at traffic stops 
and the other sharply 
limited poli ce officers' 
use of t herm a l 
scans without a 
warrant. In both 
these 5-4 deci-
s ions, the jus-
tices broke from 
their typical al-
liances. 
Justice David 
H. Souter wrote 
the majority opin-
ion in the seat-
belt case, joined by 
Chief Justice Willi am H. Rehn-
quist and Justices Antonin 
Scali a, Anthony M. Ken-
nedy a nd Clarence Thom-
as. Scalia wrote the ther-
mal imaging opinion, 
joined by Justices Sout-
er, Thomas, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and Stephen 
Breyer. 
Cops and Slops 
The justices in-
terpreted the Fourth 
Amendment as giving 
officers broad powers 
at traffic stops. 
In Atwater, the 
Court found that an of-
ficer reasonably decided 
to arrest a driver, even 
though fines were the pen-
alty for her infractions. Sou-
ter's majori ty opinion pointed to the 
history of Old England and the 
American colonies for the principle 
that constables had broad power to 
stop and arrest those who commit-
ted even minor offenses in their 
presence. 
Having approved of the officer's 
arrest power, the Court later decid-
ed per curiam that officers could in-
ventory a car after arresting the dri-
ver for speeding and having a tinted 
windshield. Arhansas v. S ullivan. 
In contrast, Indianapolis' deci-
sion to establish roadblocks with the 
explicit purpose oflooking for drugs 
was unconstitutional. What made 
this roadblock unreasonable was the 
city's actual purpose of looking for 
drugs. The roadblock would have 
passed muster with a "regulatory" 
purpose associated with alcohol de-
tection and safety inspections. 
More important, the Court 
st ated in dicta that a dog sniffing a 
car is not a search under the Fourth 
Amendment. Thus, even though the 
government lost in City of Indi-
anapolis, the Court's declaration 
that a roadblock sniff is not a search 
may permit the use of drug-detect-
ing dogs at other kinds of road-
blocks. The Court specifi cally left 
undecided whether police may use 
a "license or sobriety checkpoint 
seizure" to detect drugs in a car. 
Determining the roadblock's 
purpose in i ndianapolis was easy 
for the Court because the 
city admitted that it 
was for drug detec-
tion. In future cases, 
the purpose of a road-
block will likely be 
vehemently litigated. 
For example, in 
Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, the ma-
jority held that the ac-
tual purpose of drug-
testing pregnant wom-
en was "to generate 
evidence for law enforce-
ment purposes," not to 
safeguard maternal and 
fetal health. Three justices 
in dissent relied on the 
District Court's finding 
that the testing was for 
med.ical, not criminal, pur-
poses. 
These cases reaffirm the Court's 
increased willingness to allow offi-
cers broad authority at traffi c stops 
and roadblocks. But as the four dis-
senters in Atwater noted, the ma-
jority relied on the absence of evi-
dence that officers routinely arrest 
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individuals for minor offenses. The 
Atwater dissenters spoke again in 
Arkansas u. Sullivan, when an offi-
cer inventoried a car a fter arresting 
the driver. They questioned wheth-
er arrests for minor offenses would 
in fact become a common police 
practice after Atwater. 
Home, Private Home 
In contrast to the cop-stop de-
cisions, Kyllo limited police powers 
with its holding that scanning the 
heat emissions from a home was a 
search. Thus, scanning without a 
warrant violated the homeowner's 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Scalia's majority opinion in 
Kyllo was remarkable for its 
breadth. He stated, "In the horne, 
aUf cases show, all details are in-
timate deta il s because the entire 
area is held safe from prying gov-
ernment eyes. n 
The dissen t viewed heat emis-
sions as waste, but the majority 
feared that even this crude tech-
nology may lead to a parade of hor-
ribly invasive practices. Thus, in 
Atwater the Court lacked evi dence 
of a problem on the streets, but in 
Kyllo the Court easily imagined 
technology creeping in a nd invad-
ing our privacy. 
The Comt will take on two 
more Four th Amendment cases 
this term that raise constitutional 
questions a bout car stops, home 
searches and police purpose. 
In Un.ited States v. Arvizu, No. 
00-1519, a border police officer in 
Douglas, A,;Z., 30 miles north of 
the Mexican border, stopped a 
minivan containi.ng driver Ralph 
Arvizu and his family. The offi cer 
believed h e had reasonable suspi-
cion of drug smuggling. 
Tbe 9th U.S. Circui t Court of 
Appeals based in San Francisco 
disagreed. It attached li ttle or no 
significan ce to the facts II pon which 
the officer relied. Among tbem were 
that Arvizu was driving a minivan , 
that be failed to acknowledge a n 
offi ce r's presence, and t hat t he 
children in the backseat had their 
feet resting on so mething. The 
court suppressed the marijuana 
found dm;ng the ill egal stop. 
United Stales v. Knights, No. 
00-1260, invites the Court to exam-
in e the protections a probationer 
has in his home and what consent 
to probation means, as well as the 
need to examlne the government's 
purpose in searching a home. 
Police officers searched the 
Napa County, Calif. , home of Mark 
Knights, who was on probation for 
a misdemeanor drug offense. The 
officers believed Knights had van-
dalized the facilities of Pacific Gas 
and Electric Cos. Without a war-
rant, officers broke into his horne, 
believing Knights' consent to proba-
tion allowed this surpri se search. 
The 9th Circuit disagreed. It 
held that the purpose of the sear ch 
must relate to probation, and that 
Knights' consent to probation did 
not constitute a waiver of his Fowth 
Amendment l; ghts. 
Despite the lack of clarity in 
the Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence, police departments and state 
legislatures will ponder t hese cases 
as they enact new policies an d 
laws. These arms of the govern-
ment will probably re-examine po-
lice powers during tra ffi c stops 
and how to construct policies with a 
purpose that meets the Court's 
scru tiny. • 
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